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Abstract
Background: The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Nigeria was launched in 2005 as part of efforts by
the federal government to achieve universal coverage using financial risk protection mechanisms. However, only
4% of the population, and mainly federal government employees, are currently covered by health insurance and
this is primarily through the Formal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme (FSSHIP) of the NHIS. This study
aimed to understand why different state (sub-national) governments decided whether or not to adopt the FSSHIP
for their employees.
Methods: This study used a comparative case study approach. Data were collected through document reviews and
48 in-depth interviews with policy makers, programme managers, health providers, and civil servant leaders.
Results: Although the programme’s benefits seemed acceptable to state policy makers and the intended
beneficiaries (employees), the feasibility of employer contributions, concerns about transparency in the NHIS and
the role of states in the FSSHIP, the roles of policy champions such as state governors and resistance by employees
to making contributions, all influenced the decision of state governments on adoption. Overall, the power of state
governments over state-level health reforms, attributed to the prevailing system of government that allows states
to deliberate on certain national-level policies, enhanced by the NHIS legislation that made adoption voluntary,
enabled states to adopt or not to adopt the program.
Conclusions: The study demonstrates and supports observations that even when the content of a programme is
generally acceptable, context, actor roles, and the wider implications of programme design on actor interests can
explain decision on policy adoption. Policy implementers involved in scaling-up the NHIS programme need to
consider the prevailing contextual factors, and effectively engage policy champions to overcome known challenges
in order to encourage adoption by sub-national governments. Policy makers and implementers in countries scaling-
up health insurance coverage should, early enough, develop strategies to overcome political challenges inherent in
the path to scaling-up, to avoid delay or stunting of the process. They should also consider the potential pitfalls of
reforms that first focus on civil servants, especially when the use of public funds potentially compromises coverage
for other citizens.
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Background
Policy making is often characterised by much attention
on the content of a health reform, but also needs to con-
sider “the actors involved in policy reform, the processes
contingent on developing and implementing change, and
the context within which policy is developed” [1]. As ob-
served by Cassells (1995), intended policies are not al-
ways in the interest of all actors, and indeed may never
be [2]. More specifically, reforms involving policies for
social health insurance may result in conflicts because
the outcome may favour or disfavour various interest
groups [3]. Similar conflicts may be observed between
national and sub-national governments in environments
where political power over resources and reforms is
shared amongst different levels of government, typified
by the federal system of government [4-6]. Such systems
of government are known to allow opportunism, dyna-
mism and self expression by sub-national governments
[7]; their existence underscores the relevance of inquiry
into the actor roles and influences in the policy environ-
ment that promote or constrain scaling-up of public
policies.
The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in
Nigeria was established by a federal government law in
1999 as a programme to help achieve universal coverage
using financial risk protection mechanisms [8]. The ac-
tual implementation of the NHIS commenced in 2005
through the Formal Sector Social Health Insurance
Programme (FSSHIP) that was established to cover em-
ployees of federal, state and local governments, and
those of private institutions employing at least ten
workers [9]. The key features of the programme are
summarized in Table 1. Other programmes envisaged by
the NHIS include a programme for rural dwellers, armed
forces, police, and allied services, students in the tertiary
institutions, voluntary contributors, and retirees.
Currently, only 4% of Nigerians (mainly federal gov-
ernment employees and their households) are covered
by health insurance, and this is largely through the
FSSHIP. Following the mandatory enlisting of federal gov-
ernment employees into the formal sector programme by
the federal government, state governments were expected
to voluntarily adopt the same programme to cover their
employees and their dependents. Such an action would
have greatly expanded the breath of coverage but that did
not happen. However, six years after the launch of the
FSSHIP, only the federal government and three out of 36
states in Nigeria – Bauchi (2008), Cross River (2007), and
Enugu (2010) – had adopted the programme despite
sustained advocacy by the NHIS and HMOs, suggesting
the existence of constraints to adoption which need to be
identified and addressed.
The paper provides information on why different state
(sub-national) governments have either adopted or not
the NHIS formal sector programme, and identifies strat-
egies that encourage adoption. The paper particularly fo-
cuses on adoption of the FSSHIP at the state level rather
than exploring implementation experiences, though such
experiences have been examined to the extent that they
influenced adoption. The information contained within
the paper will provide policy makers and implementers
in Nigeria and elsewhere with evidence that may en-
hance universal coverage reforms.
Methods
Study design
The study was carried out in 2011 and employed a mul-
tiple case study approach to help understand the con-
trasting adoption decisions made by two Nigerian states.
Case studies are preferred when “how” or “why” ques-
tions are being posed, when the investigator has little
control over events, and when the focus is on a contem-
porary phenomenon within some real-life context [10].
Multiple case studies enable comparisons between two
or more case units with similar or different contexts and
thereby help facilitate generalization [11].
The case units were Enugu and Ebonyi states in south-
east Nigeria, which have populations of 3.26 million and
2.17 million, respectively [12]. These states were selected
because they had comparable political, social, and eco-
nomic characteristics but had contrasting decisions with
respect to adoption. Both states have been governed by
the same political party since 1999, and the citizens are
predominantly civil servants, small-scale farmers,
small-scale traders, Christians and of Igbo ethnic group.
In 2011, the respective budgets were 36 billion naira
(US$440 million) for Enugu state and 61 billion naira
(US$406 million) for Ebonyi state. The FSSHIP was
adopted by Enugu state government for its civil ser-
vants (though implementation was yet to commence),
but not by Ebonyi state government. However, imple-
mentation of the FSSHIP commenced all over Nigeria
since 2005, for federal government employees working
in federal establishments across the country, and the
implementation has involved health maintenance orga-
nizations (HMOs), NHIS regional officials, and public
and private health care providers.
This study adopted the theoretical proposition that
“the decision to either adopt or not adopt a programme
is influenced by the political context, the roles played by
actors who have interests in the programme, and what
these actors stand to lose or gain because of the
programme design”. Drawing on the Walt and Gilson
framework for health policy analysis [1], the study exam-
ined the theoretical proposition by exploring the roles
played by various actors and how their decision on
adoption was influenced by contextual issues and the
programme design.
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Data were collected through document reviews and
in-depth interviews (IDIs) carried out by two inter-
viewers. Documents reviewed included state health sec-
tor policies and plans, health financing documents that
were relevant to the adoption process, and laws and
guidelines for NHIS programmes. Insights from the
document review process, the theoretical proposition
and objectives of the study, enabled generation of an ini-
tial interview guide. This was further refined during pilot
studies carried out on one of each category of actors
(Table 1) that were not included for the study, and during
initial interviews. Interviewees included policy makers in
the state government (employers), leaders of health care
provider associations (providers), state level civil servant
leaders (consumers/employees), and managers of the
FSSHIP (regulators) and HMOs (managers) operating in
these states. The interviewees either were, or should have
been, involved in the adoption process at the state level.
Interviewees were asked about the way the NHIS
adoption agenda was introduced in the state, the interac-
tions between this agenda and related political, eco-
nomic and health sector related activities in the state,
concerns about the programme design, roles played by
various stakeholders while adoption was being consid-
ered, and how such roles influenced the decision on
adoption. Follow-up interviews were carried out where
necessary to confirm or clarify emerging information. In
total, 48 interviews were conducted in English with state
level actors (26 in Enugu and 22 in Ebonyi). Ethical ap-
proval for the study was obtained from the University of
Nigeria Research Ethics Committee and the World
Health Organization.
Data analysis
Interview recordings (carried out using digital voice re-
corders) were transcribed verbatim and the transcripts
from the interviews, electronic documents and the field
notes were transferred into NVivo 8 software for ana-
lysis. Data coding was carried out by two data coders,
who also undertook the interviews. Initially, each coder
separately undertook the coding of the transcripts. Inter-
pretations were compared and appraised by the research
team to ensure coherence. The results of the initial cod-
ing, which entailed the identification of a set of emerging
themes, were compared with themes generated from the
theoretical proposition to establish a coding template.
Subsequently, the template was applied for further ana-
lysis with modifications made to the template as new
themes arose in the analysis process. Data analysis was
undertaken separately for each of the cases examined.
Pattern matching was used to examine the coding re-
sults across and within the cases. Data triangulation with
multiple sources of information, including documentary
evidence, allowed identification of corroborating or
Table 1 Description of the formal sector programme of the NHIS [8,9]
Key actors • The National Health Insurance Scheme (regulators).
• Federal, state and local governments (employers) and their employees.
• Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) (paid by the NHIS to manage new enrollees, and pay capitations and
reimbursements).
• Healthcare providers (as individual doctors, pharmacists, etc., leaders of provider and practice associations, and facility
owners).
Revenue collection and
pooling
• The law establishing the NHIS mandates HMOs to collect contributions from employers, but in practice, NHIS does the
collection. NHIS can receive additional funds including grants, donations, and also dividends and interests from
investments using pooled funds.
• The specified role of states and local governments in the FSSHIP is that they, as employers of labour, were expected to
make contributions on behalf of their employees to the scheme.
• Federal government pays the equivalent of 10% of employees’ basic salary to the NHIS, and states and local
governments are expected to do the same if they adopt the FSSHIP.
• Employee pays 5% of basic salary which is deducted at source. NHIS requires the states intending to adopt the
programme to hand over the fund to them in advance and on quarterly basis.
• NHIS pools funds at the federal level, and allocates them to HMOs to make capitation payments and fee for service
reimbursements to providers on behalf of beneficiaries allocated to HMOs.
Provider • Private and public facilities of all levels (primary, secondary, and tertiary) can provide primary care. Over 95% of providers
are private.
• Referral care is provided by secondary and tertiary facilities.
Purchasing • HMOs disburse global capitation for primary care to providers. Referral care requires pre-approval by HMO, and provider
is reimbursed on fee for service basis in relation to a fee schedule developed by the NHIS. NHIS pays administrative fees
to HMOs for paying capitation and fee-for-service reimbursements.
Benefit package • Out-patient care (including consumables), prescriptions, and diagnostic tests as contained in the National Essential
Drugs List and Diagnostic Test Lists, maternity care, preventive medical and dental care, specialist consultation, in-patient
care (not exceeding 15 days per year), eye examination and care, and access to locally produced prostheses.
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contradicting information. Similarities and differences in
views and experiences across different groups of respon-
dents were identified and explanations were sought for
key differences.
Post-study workshops in each of the states examined
were used to present the preliminary findings to study
participants in order to discuss and validate the analysis.
The participants reached agreements on issues of inter-
est, a number of conflicting views held by stakeholders
were clarified, and consensus on the results of the ana-
lysis was reached. Particular effort was made to identify
and explore views and experiences that were unusual in
the context of each data set. Subsequent analysis was
undertaken to reflect the discussion that occurred dur-
ing the post-study workshops.
Results
The desire of the NHIS to expand coverage of the
FSSHIP in line with its operational mandate, and the
interest of HMOs in attracting more members to their
pools, motivated both stakeholders, acting as advocates
for the FSSHIP, to independently approach both states
to encourage adoption. Prompted by the NHIS and
HMOs, the leadership of the Ministry of Health initiated
and facilitated the agenda for Ebonyi state to adopt the
programme, while in Enugu, the state governor wel-
comed the idea and directed a state-level team to ap-
praise the policy and the requirements for adoption. The
roles played by actors involved in appraising and decid-
ing on adoption are presented below while the important
policy context and design issues that influenced the roles
of these actors are summarised in Table 2.
Case one: Ebonyi state (non-adopters of the programme)
The request made by the NHIS for the state to ‘fold into
the scheme’ as an employer of labour was interpreted by
policy makers to mean handing over state funds to a fed-
eral government agency. Key policy makers in the state
government considered both the absence of a govern-
ance role for states in the running of FSSHIP and a per-
ceived lack of transparency in the NHIS, which makes it
“difficult for us to do a blind transfer of state money to
them (NHIS)” (Policy Maker), as major impediments to
adoption. The contentious issue which was yet to be re-
solved was the level of government that would hold the
contributions.
“States have been arguing to have custody of the fund,
but the federal says ‘No; this is our parastatal’. The
misunderstanding has made people to lose interest”
(Policy Maker, Ebonyi).
In addition, policy makers, like civil servants, reported
the absence of positive reports from neighbours and
friends about the FSSHIP (which they considered more
valuable than media adverts employed by the NHIS),
and also the potential negative implications of not hav-
ing control over their money (which was shaped by pre-
vious experience with another federal contributory
scheme), as impediments to adoption. To the policy
makers, “The natural or real local testimonies from fed-
eral workers living in the state” (Policy maker) were not
forthcoming, but such evidence would have made em-
ployees allow deductions from their salaries.
Despite reluctance towards adoption, the government,
through the Ministry of Health, engaged with civil ser-
vants to appraise their interest in adoption. However,
this was on the premise that civil servants would have to
part with the medical allowance already being paid to
them, which the government would reallocate as em-
ployer’s contribution for the FSSHIP. This meant that
civil servants would part with their medical allowance
(10% of the basic salary), apart from the employee con-
tribution of 5% of their basic salary. Both policy makers
and civil servants considered this impracticable with the
latter deciding not to support adoption because they
were unconvinced that the access they would gain to the
programme benefits would be sustained in the long-run,
given the risk that the scheme may collapse “like the
National Housing Fund which failed” (Civil servants’
leader). They therefore opted to retain control over their
existing medical allowances rather than have it converted
to contributions for the FSSHIP. This position eased local
pressure on the government for adoption.
“There is nothing pushing us to adopt it because if the
workers were interested, they could have asked like
they do for other things. They seem to be comfortable
with the medical allowance already approved for
them” (Policy maker).
As a strategy to overcome the prevailing challenge, the
NHIS, HMOs, and civil servants suggested that the gov-
ernment should release fresh funds to make-up the em-
ployer contributions, but the suggestion was rejected by
the government who insisted that there was a moral re-
sponsibility for the government to spend remaining
funds on other citizens since civil servants were already
receiving medical allowance. This caused HMOs and
NHIS programme managers to deem the governor (seen
as the prime determinant of the adoption decision) and
his government uninterested in adoption.
“I can tell you honestly, having interacted with many of
them [policy makers and NHIS officials] during our
[advocacy] visits, the main person there is the governor.
If the governor should wake up today to say, ‘I’m doing
this thing [adopting the programme], let me just take the
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risk’, he will do it. The other policy makers and the NHIS
have their limits. They will only send proposals, make
recommendations; but it is left with the big man to adopt
it. If he says the government does not have money to do
it, there is nothing you can do”. (HMO manager).
Requests by the NHIS and HMOs for meetings to bet-
ter inform the state executive council about the benefits
of FSSHIP were ignored by key policy makers who ar-
gued that the government’s concerns (which were not
about benefits) were known, and no request had been
Table 2 Key policy context and design issues influencing actor roles
Policy context Ebonyi (Non-adopters of the programme) Enugu (Programme adopters)
Policy agenda of
government –interest in
financial risk protection
Existing public programmes for financial risk protection. Existing public programmes for financial risk protection.
Spends about US$100,000 monthly on free maternal and
child health (MCH) services in rural areas using public and
non-profit private facilities. The focus on rural areas was
based on the governor’s philosophy that the share of the
financial consequences of ill health was more on the more
populous rural dwellers.
Funds free MCH services (state-wide using public facilities).
Funds a vesico-vaginal fistula programme. No medical allowance for civil servants though previously
requested by them.
Medical allowance (10% of basic salary paid to civil servants
monthly to help defray health care expenditure).
Role of states in the
FSSHIP
States as federating units are allowed to deliberate on
health policies even when approved by the federal
government. Concerns were raised that the scheme was a
federal government programme which meant states had to
transfer funds to the federal level for a scheme which was
established by federal law that did not specify a role for
states apart from their broad inclusion as employers of
labour.
Concerned about absence of role for states and initially
considered setting up a state level health insurance
scheme.
Civil servants and policy makers had previous negative
experiences with a contributory federal led programme
(national housing fund): they made contributions, were yet
to enjoy the benefits, and could not retrieve their funds.
The choice of the FSSHIP was made to take advantage of
existing institutional structure and technical capacity for
managing insurance considered lacking in state but
available in the NHIS.
Accountability systems for
FSSHIP
Concerns expressed by policy makers that the NHIS had not
presented any audited report to the state or the general
public since its inception which created the feeling of
distrust towards the scheme. This view was also
corroborated by HMOs.
Accountability issues were not raised during the adoption
process.
Design issues
Employer contribution Policy makers considered the level of employer
contribution (10%) acceptable and economically feasible as
long as the already paid medical allowance would be
reallocated to the programme.
Government was willing to make contribution.
Employee contribution Civil servants considered wages too low to allow
deductions even though the rate of 5% was considered
reasonable.
Civil servants considered capitation rate reasonable.
Wanted payment deferred and to allow them time (at least
one year of benefiting from the programme) to be
convinced about actor commitment to implementation.
Also felt they would not be asked to contribute in the long
run because NHIS had allowed federal employees not to
pay since inception of the programme in 2005, which
suggested that employer contribution was sufficient for
running the FSSHIP.
Capitation rates and drug
list
Generally considered inadequate by providers. Considered inadequate by providers given that the failure
of the NHIS to revise the rates within the first 6 years of
implementation.
Most providers report frequent conflicts with dissatisfied
federal employees that they provide services to for two
main reasons: low capitation and an unrevised schedule of
drugs (since 2005) that meant patients had to buy unlisted
drugs out of pocket.
Concerns about drug schedule which had not been
revised.
Benefit package Considered sufficient enough to address most needs of civil
servants and their households.
Same as for Ebonyi state.
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made to discuss strategies to address the concerns.
Moreover, policy makers felt that rather than persist in
asking the state government to make new employer con-
tributions to enable adoption, the NHIS and HMOs
should have taken advantage of the governor’s interest in
the welfare of rural dwellers and suggested ways of de-
veloping successful health insurance products for this
group. They believed that such a strategy could have
been used to prompt positive testimonies that would
have encouraged civil servants to use their medical al-
lowance for the FSSHIP. According to a policy maker, “If
federal government sends a proposal, we can then say,
let’s do it our own way; another state’s proposal may not
make much sense to us”. The NHIS, focused on the
FSSHIP at the time and unable to force the state to
adopt the programme, shifted attention to other states.
As observed by a NHIS manager, “If it were an activity
that only the federal government can legislate, a state
government will have no choice than to accept it; but we
cannot impose it on them, since they [states] have the au-
thority to accept or to refuse it based on their own legis-
lation. This is why we are trying to change the law to
make it mandatory”. On their part, HMOs were reluc-
tant to invest significantly in the state because of the al-
leged policy makers’ disinterest in the scheme and
uncertainties about the process of HMO selection. Both
HMOs and the NHIS also did not engage with civil ser-
vants to discuss options for addressing the problem of
employee contributions.
A general state of apathy also existed amongst health
provider associations (physicians and pharmacists)
though the leaders insisted that they could have put
pressure on the government if adoption had been in
their interest. These interests, however, differed. The
position of the physicians’ union was attributed to fre-
quent complaints by members providing health services
under the FSSHIP to local federal employees about the in-
adequacy of capitation, which had not been revised for the
six years since implementation. In addition, union mem-
bers reported that patients often expressed dissatisfaction
with services and attributed this to an out-dated drug list
that left patients making drug purchases out-of-pocket,
while providing HMOs with additional profits. Members
believed that these failures negatively affected their reputa-
tion and discouraged members from supporting adoption.
Pharmacists believed that the practice of global capi-
tation coupled with the low capitation, made facility
owners (doctors) use only facility-owned drugs rather
than issuing prescriptions for patients to obtain drugs
from registered pharmacies. Their observation that fa-
cility owners employed and controlled their own staff
and drug-management systems foreclosed the expected
independent-assessment of prescriptions, and made
pharmacists irrelevant actors in the FSSHIP.
“Doctors use their clinic, and diagnose, prescribe and
dispense at the same time. They do not send patients
to private pharmacies. The proper thing should be that
you prescribe, you move, then the next person handles
his own aspect, everybody will be involved and can
check the other person in the interest of the patient.
Let us not do it as if we are trying to kill the
pharmacy profession” (Leader, pharmacists’
association).
While HMOs denied making excess profits from the
capitation problem, a HMO manager noted that low
capitation was “a burning issue” whenever it was raised
among providers. However, the NHIS believed that low
capitation, although an important issue to address, was
not the main issue; rather, they felt that most providers
still did not understand the cross-subsidising nature of
insurance.
Case two: Enugu state (programme adopters)
The successful adoption of the programme in Enugu
was attributed by interviewees to the initiation of the
agenda and leadership provided by the state governor,
who showed sustained interest in adoption, and set up
and monitored a technical committee that considered
FSSHIP design and the feasibility of adoption. Having
appraised various issues of interest (Table 2), the state
government initially considered modifying the design
such that a state-level health insurance scheme would
operate the programme, and where that did not work
out, to directly contract with HMOs to run the
programme. The aim was to retain state government’s
control over its funds. Following an acknowledgement of
the paucity of local capacity for managing the scheme,
the government adopted the FSSHIP, after making an
unsuccessful attempt to secure a reduction in the em-
ployer contribution rate. This action was informed by
the perceived lack of effort exhibited by the NHIS to-
wards collection of contributions from federal employees
and the existence of cheaper health insurance products
offered to informal sector workers by some HMOs, both
of which suggested that employer and employee contri-
bution rates could be reduced.
While the state contemplated the decision, the NHIS
national leadership made a strong advocacy visit to the
governor, agreeing to overlook employee contributions
in the interim period as demanded by civil servants. Its
regional office subsequently provided a road map for
adoption, participated in state technical meetings, and
supported government’s intention to pass a law that
would sustain adoption. The willingness of the governor
to release funds for employer contributions roused the
interest of policy advocates. Consequently, HMOs sup-
ported adoption by financing a workshop to help allay
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worker fears, providing guidance to policy makers dur-
ing their negotiations with the NHIS, and by encour-
aging the passage of the law to sustain adoption and to
avoid termination of the programme if a change of gov-
ernment occurred, as had happened in another state.
With previous fears amongst policy makers minimised,
the law establishing the scheme passed by the state
house of assembly ended up being a two-page document
that essentially declared adoption in line with existing
NHIS guidelines.
The decision of civil servants to support adoption
resulted from efforts they made to understand the con-
cept of health insurance and the FSSHIP design, with
the help of HMOs, and their successful negotiation of a
favourable position (not to make employee contributions
in the short term) during engagements with policy makers
and legislators. They declared informed (conditional) en-
dorsement for adoption through a communiqué sent to
the government’s technical committee.
On their part, leaders of doctors and pharmacists in
the state raised similar concerns as their counterparts in
Ebonyi state with respect to capitation, and were op-
posed to adoption. Doctors considered the capitation
amount of 550 naira (US$3.6) too small to allow them
“Pay a pharmacy when someone buys drugs there” (Med-
ical union leader). Given the small amount, it was also
considered inappropriate to lump various provider ser-
vices within it, knowing that “Nobody wants to release
the one he has” (Medical union leader). Providers how-
ever observed that though insufficient capitation report-
edly stirred dissatisfaction amongst existing FSSHIP
beneficiaries, user complaints appeared minimal because
enrollees had no financial commitment to the programme.
Nonetheless, providers were faced with the added duty
explaining inadequacies in the system, and this situation
further made them unwilling to promote the programme
to patients and government. However, unlike other actors,
professional health provider associations were not in-
volved in the adoption process, were not included in the
technical committee, and were unaware of the public
hearing to consider adoption. This meant that their con-
cerns, which pitched them against adoption, were not
taken into account. Policy makers considered this an over-
sight rather than a deliberate act, but believed the out-
come of adoption should be acceptable to providers as the
primary economic beneficiaries of adoption.
Discussion
These case studies show that adoption occurred or not,
not necessarily due to the content of the programme de-
sign, but due to the political and economic interests of ac-
tors involved in the scheme and the roles played or not by
those actors given the policy context and programme de-
sign. The findings support the observation that health
reform is a highly political process involving many actors
within a state or society (including policy makers, health
providers and consumers) with interests that may be af-
fected by a proposed policy change [1,3,13-16]. Both cases
were similar with respect to existence of financial risk pro-
tection measures covering some citizens of the state (preg-
nant women and children), positive perceptions about the
benefit package, an absence of local pressure on policy
makers by civil servants and providers, employees’ views
about contributions, and provider concerns about capita-
tion and the drug schedule. They however differed signifi-
cantly in the interests of actors and roles they played.
Three key factors that influenced adoption are presented
below along with recommendations on how to improve
on them to encourage adoption especially in settings
where political power over resources and reforms is
shared amongst different levels of government.
Adoption is influenced by contextual factors such as the
way political power is shared and used by actors at
various levels of government
Policy advocates have encouraged the adoption of the
FSP by states within the context of ‘power sharing’ be-
tween national and sub-national levels for public pol-
icies. The power of state governments over state-level
health reforms, attributed to the prevailing federal sys-
tem of government that allows states (federating units)
to deliberate on certain federal government policies such
as the NHIS, was exercised in the policy appraisal
process and shaped its outcome. This was further en-
abled by the NHIS legislation that made adoption volun-
tary, and the non-inclusive nature of the NHIS Act,
which overlooked states in its governance structure,
thereby giving them no influence over use of their own
funds. Poor accountability posturing at the NHIS, given
previous negative experiences of state level actors only
further encouraged sub-national resistance. Scaling up
processes require sub-national support and leadership
[17]. Garnering support would even be more expedient
in setting as the one studied here, where states wield
power over reforms. However, the top-down scaling-up
approach used for the FSSHIP created opportunities for
states to either consider modification of the design to
suite local interests or to sideline deliberations on adop-
tion, thereby threatening the intentions of the policy
advocates.
Though design issues may be acceptable, adoption is
affected by considerations about the feasibility of
implementing them
In Ebonyi state adoption was considered unfeasible be-
cause additional funds would be allocated to civil ser-
vants’ welfare, potentially at the expense of the welfare
of other citizens who were of political interest to the
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government. The defining opportunity of using medical
allowance (deployed in Enugu state that previously had
no such commitment to workers) was no longer avail-
able to the government, but the government had already
made that commitment and civil servants were happy
with it. From the governments’ point of view, adoption
is only feasible if resources are allocated fairly towards
the welfare of various categories of citizens. Allocating
new funds to civil servants’ welfare was not appealing as
it could threaten this equilibrium and limit the govern-
ment’s intentions for other citizens. Political feasibility,
coupled with earlier noted concerns about transparency
and programme effectiveness, may underlie the unwill-
ingness to adopt the FSSHIP by 33 of the 36 states in
Nigeria.
Apart from employee contribution, it also appears dif-
ficult to commence collection of employee contributions
both at the national and now the state level. While, so-
cial health insurance (SHI) typically requires wage
earners to make contributions [18-21], there are con-
cerns that SHI implementation strategies that initially
focus on civil servants (who are easier to identify and
cover) may impact negatively on those not covered, and
consequently, derail efforts towards universal coverage
[22]. The growing unwillingness by civil servants to
make contributions (at both federal and state levels) im-
plies underfunding of the FSSHIP, a perpetuation of the
use of public funds to provide ‘free’ services to civil ser-
vants, who make no contribution towards social health
insurance, and a further erosion of the possibility of
using public spending to cover other citizens.
Adoption at sub-national levels is influenced by the
position and influence of key actors at this level
Just as the interest and position assumed by national
leaders acting as reform drivers affect the speed of re-
forms [3], this study shows that at sub-national levels,
similar situations occur for policy adoption. Apart from
the political context, perceived and actual problems in
the NHIS including its accountability shortcomings, al-
leged shortage of local evidence of impact and imple-
mentation challenges amongst providers, were observed
by and influenced the position of all local actors. Conse-
quently, there were critical differences in the roles of
policy champions (i.e., key policy makers, such as the
governor, that largely determine the direction the gov-
ernment takes on a specified agenda). The state gov-
ernor in Enugu, opting to adopt the programme, served
as a rallying point for the process, while the govern-
ment’s decision to make employer contributions became
a critical enabling factor for adoption. Conversely, the
key leaders in Ebonyi were opposed to adoption, and re-
stricted engagements with the policy advocates of the
FSSHIP, even though they allowed the Ministry of
Health, acting as the prime driver to engage with other
actors. Nonetheless, dismissing the state government as
being disinterested in the FSSHIP adoption, when the
NHIS and HMOs could have taken advantage of the
government’s financial commitment towards the welfare
of disadvantaged groups to develop and test products for
other citizens such as rural dwellers appears to be a
missed opportunity. Such policy options that address
political interests of local policy makers need not be ig-
nored by policy advocates, as the success in creating de-
sired ‘local testimony’ through them, may additionally
temper the resistance of civil servants towards allowing
salary deductions, and enhance the chance of adoption
of the FSSHIP in the long run.
The observation that civil servants would take a rela-
tively neutral stance when not asked to pay to become
members of the scheme, but resist adoption when asked
to pay, also shaped the FSSHIP scale-up. While the rea-
son for resistance or disinterest amongst providers was
mainly financial, it appeared (for civil servants) to be
due to ‘distrust’ – they were interested only to the extent
that the income they were already certain about would
not be ploughed into a programme which could collapse
after a while. Such programme failure would jeopardize
their access to the benefits of the scheme and also leave
them without a guarantee that they would recover their
money. The complementary roles played by the NHIS
and HMOs facilitated opportunities for engagement with
the policy makers to clarify concerns that otherwise
would hinder adoption in one state. The engagements
present in Enugu, which facilitated temporary waiver of
employee contributions and legislation to help ensure
programme sustainability, were lacking in Ebonyi and
can be considered an important factor in creation of
trust in the scheme amongst civil servants.
Finally, the findings that health care provider disinter-
est seemed to impede the adoption process in one state
and the exclusion of providers in the policy discussion
enabled adoption in the other state reflects their import-
ance as local actors in the adoption process. The global
capitation system used for the programme pitched inde-
pendent pharmacists against doctors as it has excluded
them from being primary financial beneficiaries even
though they were originally accredited as providers. Such
conflicts are at the detriment of adoption. Studies have
demonstrated the importance of health providers as
‘street level bureaucrats’ whose engagement with pa-
tients and the policy making process can influence policy
decisions and implementation [23-26]. Ignoring provider
concerns during adoption may only shift policy resist-
ance to the implementation period.
While the use of two cases (states) with contrasting
decisions on adoption of FSSHIP serves as a major
strength of this study, the use of only two cases may
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have limited the scope for exploring factors affecting
states’ decisions on adoption. The position of the re-
searchers as outsiders in the adoption process may have
also limited the information accessible to them, but also
enhanced the willingness of the different actors to share
information with them. The fact that the actors
interviewed already knew about FSSHIP and may have
provided services for federal employees residing in the
state significantly shaped their views about the
programme. Nonetheless, the findings of this study high-
light the value of using multiple rather than single case
studies, in policy analysis and the value of qualitative
methods in understanding health policy reforms [1,10].
Overall, this study suggests that the NHIS first needs to
resolve problems with existing FSSHIPs in order to earn
the trust of stakeholders because the perceived and ac-
tual problems are observed by and influence all state
level actors. For instance, the NHIS council, in line with
the legal provisions establishing it, should commence
the annual publication of reports on its activities and its
audited accounts. Such information should be made
available to all states, which should have well-defined
governance roles, whether or not they have adopted the
programme, since all states are being courted to adopt.
Given the political context, it is uncertain if an NHIS
Act that mandates states to adopt its programme will
work out in practice or, alternatively, whether efforts at
scaling-up would yield better results if states had author-
ity over some aspects of the programme including re-
source control. Capitation rates and the schedule of
drugs need to be revised to encourage provider support
for adoption. The reason for the inability of the NHIS to
collect employee contributions also needs to be identi-
fied, understood, and addressed in order to incentivize
civil servants to release employee contributions. Not
doing so may jeopardize the future of the programme. A
focused exploration of the implementation process of
the FSSHIP will also be necessary to better inform ef-
forts at addressing concerns impeding adoption.
Conclusions
This study demonstrates and supports observations that
even though the content of a programme is generally ac-
ceptable, a favourable context, actors’ roles, and wider
implications of the design on actors’ interests explain de-
cisions concerning adoption. Policy implementers in-
volved in scaling-up the programme should develop
strategies to address context-related challenges of indi-
vidual states, such as the inability to reallocate funds
into the programme, in order to assist states overcome
hindrances to adoption. Policy implementers also need
to be aware that policy adoption can be influenced by
perceptions about the effectiveness of an existing, corre-
sponding programme and such perceptions may hinder
adoption out-rightly or shape the outcome of the adop-
tion process.
Policy makers and implementers in countries scaling-
up health insurance coverage need to carefully consider
potential pitfalls of employing universal coverage strat-
egies that first focus on civil servants, especially when
providing coverage to this group using public funds may
potentially compromise the availability of financial risk
protection measures to other citizens. In addition, it
should be noted that decisions to allow a period of time
for civil servants to ‘test’ the benefits of a programme
before they start making contributions may be difficult
to reverse and may become a reference point that gener-
ates resistance amongst prospective contributors. There
is also a need to recognize the importance and interests
of policy champions, such as state governors, in pushing
health reforms to enhance the chances of policy adop-
tion. Finally, health care providers need to be incorpo-
rated into shaping adoption of policies or programmes
to ensure desired outcomes are achieved without resist-
ance from this group.
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